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1. (U) Diplomatic Security Daily, October 31, 2008
2. (U) Iraq ) Paragraphs 7-15
3. (U) Significant Events ) Paragraphs 16-24
4. (U) Key Concerns ) Paragraphs 25-39
5. (U) Cyber Threats ) Paragraphs 40-47
6. (U) Suspicious Activity Incidents ) Paragraphs 48-68
7. (U) Iraq
8. (S//NF) Security operations effective in curbing attacks on Basrah International Airfield:
9. (S//NF) DS/TIA/ITA wishes to highlight excerpts from a recent NGA report reviewing countermeasures put in place at the Basrah International Airfield, which is home to -- among other USG contingents mentioned in the report -- a U.S. Regional Embassy Office (REO). REOBasrah has been particularly susceptible to indirect fire (IDF) due largely to its proximity to Jaysh al-Mahdi Special Groups (JAM-SG) and other Shi'a militants for whom IDF, with its standoff qualities, remains a weapon of choice.
10. (S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR) Between March and June, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) launched a 14-phase offensive, Operation Charge of the Knights, to regain control of Basrah Province from insurgents and militants. This operation successfully curbed IDF on Basrah International Airfield and effectively ended attacks originating inside the city limits of Basrah. IDF attacks against the airfield have decreased by 83 percent since operation,s Phase 1 ended on April 1. Geospatial intelligence analysis indicates attacks originating near the center of the city of Basrah have diminished since the operation, but attacks originating north of the Qarmat Ali waterway have continued, albeit at lower levels.
11. (S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR) Basrah International Airfield is home to Coalition forces, Contingency Operating Base (COB) Basrah and is the headquarters of the 70th Iraqi Air Force Squadron, the Iraqi Army 14th Division Intelligence

Surveillance and Reconnaissance Company, and the 14th Division Bomb Disposal Company. Because of its importance to Coalition forces and ISF, the airfield has historically been a target of IDF attacks by insurgents and other militants since Operation Iraqi Freedom began.

¶12. (S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR) Operation Charge of the Knights was an Iraqi security initiative that used elements of the Iraqi Army, Ministry of Interior, and local police forces to quell insurgent violence in Basrah Province. The operation began on March 25, lasted approximately 90 days, and was executed in 14 phases. Although all phases involved eradicating violent elements from the city of Basrah, several focused on securing other areas of Basrah Province, including the cities of al Qurnah, al Faw, and Abu al Khasib. ISF has maintained high visibility throughout both the city and province since operations began, according to analysis of imagery.

¶13. (S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL) Imagery analysis and DoD reporting indicate the Basrah Khorramshahr Port of Entry (POE) -- the closest land-based border crossing to the city of Basrah -- has been closed to vehicular traffic since the beginning of the operation, to prevent weapons and insurgent smuggling from Iran. Multi-National Division Southeast reports the closure of the POE has helped stem the flow of weapons from Iran into the city.

¶14. (S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR) The monthly attack average since the operation is significantly less than the monthly attack average of the three months preceding the start of the operations. Since April 1, analysis shows a change in geographic distribution in points of origin for IDF attacks from inside the city of Basrah to the outskirts of the city. Such a shift indicates the operation was successful in curbing attacks in the city, probably driving militants out of the city center.

¶15. (S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL) The number of IDF attacks against Basrah International Airfield has dropped significantly since Operation Charge of the Knights. However, DoD reporting indicates the insurgents who recently trained in Iran are attempting to re-enter Iraq via the Basrah Khorramshahr POE. When the Basrah Khorramshahr POE reopens to vehicular traffic, IDF attacks on the airfield will likely increase, because insurgents who fled security operations in Basrah may return, and weapons will be more easily smuggled from Iran. Because the POE is only 20 km east of the city, there is a strong likelihood that militants using this POE will return to the city of Basrah to carry out attacks on the airfield. (Please see imagery on pages 5-6). (Appendix source 1)

#### ¶16. (U) Significant Events

¶17. (SBU) WHA - Brazil - U.S. Embassy Brasilia received a suspicious letter October 30 mailed from Lap, Sao Paulo. The letter was opened in the weapons of mass destruction mailroom facility where it revealed a typed letter to all people of the world concerning the powers the divine God of Chyren. The letter, with dried blood smeared on the pages, talked about the future of the world and the apocalypse; however, most of the letter was impossible to understand. There was no evidence of pathogens or other substances in the envelope, so mailroom operations returned to normal. The RSO will pass the information to the Brazilian Federal Police for follow up. (RSO Brasilia Spot Report)

¶18. (SBU) EUR - Lithuania - U.S. Embassy Vilnius received a telephonic bomb threat at 2:23 p.m. on October 30. The caller stated (in Lithuanian) a bomb was going to explode if he did not get \$1 billion dollars. The call was recorded and reviewed by Embassy security elements. Local guard assets searched the compound and Marines at Post One reviewed cameras; nothing was found out of place on the compound. The local police were notified to investigate further. (RSO Vilnius Spot Report)

¶19. (SBU) AF - Democratic Republic of Congo - Emergency Action Committee (EAC) Kinshasa convened October 30 to discuss the October 29 evacuation of USG staff and the current security situation in the eastern region of the country. The EAC recommended continued travel restrictions to eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and that all Mission staff remain in Gisenyi until further notice. The U.S. Embassy remains concerned about the potential for violent demonstrations within Kinshasa, especially against the United Nations in the DRC. Post officials will continue to closely monitor the situation and report ongoing developments. (Kinshasa 0952)

¶20. (C) Djibouti - EAC Djibouti met on October 30 to discuss the attacks in Hargeysa, Somaliland, and Bossaso, Puntland. EAC members agreed the method and apparent level of coordination of the attack are unprecedented in Somaliland. EAC members were unaware of any specific threats against the U.S. Embassy or U.S. Citizens/interests in-country; however, members noted the recommendation of Djiboutian officials to the RSO that the Embassy increase its security posture. Despite the proximity of the Embassy to the neighboring Ethiopian Embassy and UN compound, the EAC assesses the Djiboutian Government, despite its limited resources, will fully support Post in any emergency situation. The Embassy has been at a heightened security level since the September 17 attack on Embassy Sana'a in Yemen. (Appendix source 2)

¶21. (S//NF) Sudan - On September 29, the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the U.S. charge d'affaires that the Government of Sudan (GoS) would not allow an Embassy trip to Nyala and a joint United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur-USG trip to East Jebel Marra, Darfur, scheduled for September 30. This denial came after a week of submitting three diplomatic notes, high-level discussions between multiple USG representatives, and even the Embassy's prompt response to the unusual request for information about the airplane's flight crew. While this is not the first time the GoS has denied USG travel, it illustrates a number of realities about the nature of the GoS, its strategy in dealing with the international community, and its paranoia about more exposure to the troubled region of Darfur. (Appendix source 3)

¶22. (S//NF) EAP - Burma - EAC Rangoon met October 30 to discuss arrangements for the upcoming election night events. The RSO advised he will request host-nation security support for the event; deploy additional local guards; make all the security arrangements; and continue to liaise with Government of Burma security offices for the latest intelligence concerning any threat to the event. (Appendix source 4)

¶23. (SBU) China - On October 27 at 2 p.m., Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Beijing reported a fire had broken out in the computer server room. The office is located on the 17th floor of the Silver Tower. The fire was limited to the computer server room, but smoke affected the entire office and could be smelled throughout much of the building. All ICE employees were accounted for. Two ICE and one Customs and Border Protection American direct hires suffered from smoke inhalation and were transported to Peking University Hospital for treatment. The server room was heavily damaged, with many pieces of equipment charred or melted. The local fire department is conducting an investigation of the fire. The ICE offices will remain closed pending damage estimates and developments in the investigation. The server room supported all USG offices located in the Silver Tower office building. The U.S. Embassy staff is developing work-arounds for providing services to affected offices. (Beijing 4098)

¶24. (SBU) SCA - India - EAC Kolkata convened October 30 to discuss multiple bomb blasts in Assam State. At the time of this writing, as many as 12 blasts occurred almost simultaneously in Assam's capital of Guwahati and towns to the north, including Kokrajhar, Barpet, and Bonbaigaon. Currently, all known AmCits in the region have been accounted for, and a DoD contingency group working in northeast Assam and Arunchal Pradesh has been contacted and is safe. The EAC

discussed the ongoing violence and unpredictability, and agreed a new travel restriction to Assam should be imposed for USG employees and their family members. The EAC also approved a Warden Message addressing the situation in Assam. (Kolkata 0300)

¶25. (U) Key Concerns

¶26. (//GBR S//FVEY) EUR - Turkey - KGK reportedly preparing attack: Tearline released October 30 indicates a Kongra-Gel (KGK) commander has issued instructions for KGK operatives to carry out attacks targeting associates of the conservative Nationalist Movement Party as well as state personnel. Additionally, KGK has been transferring personnel to the Adana, Mersin, and Amanoslar regions, with the aim of carrying out attention-grabbing attacks and to act as reinforcements. DS/TIA/ITA notes, while this threat stream has been developing for some time, and KGK threats this time of year and in these locations are not unusual, the information indicating the transfer of personnel to Adana -- a city with a developed Western tourist infrastructure, a U.S. diplomatic presence, and a major U.S. military base with more than 5,000 personnel -- is troublesome; additionally, Mersin is another nearby city with a major tourism industry and was the scene of a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device earlier this year. Although U.S. interests should not be targeted directly by any KGK attack, it is likely, given the dense nature of Adana and Mersin, official American personnel may be in the vicinity if and when an attack occurs, and collateral damage could result. (Appendix source 5)

¶27. (S//NF) NEA - Israel/Palestinian Territories - According to Jordanian General Intelligence Department information, an al-Qa,ida operative in Lebanon (linked to known al-Qa,ida facilitator ,Imad) claimed al-Qa,ida,s plan to target Israel would be a small operation because the poor financial situation is insufficient to support large operations. There is no further information on timing, methods, or targets of this operation.

¶28. (S//NF) DS/TIA/ITA notes, while reports of al-Qa,ida,s influence in Gaza exist, there is no information regarding definitive attack planning targeting Israel. Prior tearline information reported, &According to uncorroborated information from Middle East sources in September, al-Qa,ida,s presence was reportedly growing in the Gaza Strip. Al-Qai,da was thought to have gotten a start in the Gaza Strip as early as 2001 with the pro-Taliban demonstrations and rallies. It was speculated that some of the more extreme Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) members began adopting the al-Qa,ida ideology at the beginning of ¶2004. By 2006, al-Qa,ida had allegedly taken a more tangible form with the appearance of Jaysh al-Islam, a splinter of the PRC group that was thought to have ties to al-Qa,ida facilitator Ahmad al-Mazlum.<sup>8</sup> Previous reporting indicated a small number of individuals affiliated with al-Qa,ida in Gaza. Reporting from mid-August alleged an eight-person al-Qa,ida cell led by an Egyptian national was operating in Gaza. This information originated with the Palestinian Mukhabarat and remains uncorroborated. The arrest of six self-identified al-Qa,ida members in July suggested influence of al-Qa,ida in Israel, but did not indicate any actual contact with al-Qa,ida members, with the exception of a chat room conversation. Prior reporting such as the unsubstantiated claim by a Gaza-based al-Qa,ida sympathizer that suicide bombers were going to attack U.S. interests in late July demonstrates the influence of al-Qa,ida within Gaza and the presence of sympathizers. Recent tearline information indicates a larger al-Qa,ida influence and presence in the Gaza Strip than earlier reporting.

¶29. (S//NF) ,Abd al-Aziz al-Jammaz, a.k.a. Imad aka Salman, is a known Lebanon-based al-Qa,ida-linked facilitator and operator associated with the hotbed of extremist activity in the,Ayn al-Hilwah Palestinian refugee camp. The Saudi-born Imad is suspected of involvement in multiple terrorist operations, including attacks against

¶30. (S//NF) DS/TIA/ITA further notes the likelihood of an al-Qa,ida-linked attack in Israel increases if the alleged growing al-Qa,ida presence in Gaza is successfully combined with the experience and networks of foreign extremists such as Imad. However, it is unlikely a transnational al-Qa,ida operation within Israel would be &small,8 as the source of this report contends. Israel presents a difficult operating environment, and the subsequent reaction of Israeli security forces would likely be severe -- deterrent factors which suggest any extremist operation would likely be commensurate in size to the risk. Lacking further information on the ultimate source of this information and the vague nature of the threat, the credibility of this threat remains questionable. (Appendix sources 6-9)

¶31. (S//NF) SCA - Afghanistan - NDS officer facilitating suicide bombers targeting Westerners: As of mid-October, a purported officer of the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) named Mustafa was facilitating two suicide bombers. A sensitive source with thirdhand access claimed that one of the bombers intended to target Westerners or International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) elements in Kabul. The second bomber wanted to target the Wardak Province Provincial governor or an individual named Haji Mosa.

¶32. (S//NF) DS/TIA/ITA name checks on NDS officer Mustafa and Haji Mosa were inconclusive. Insurgents have increasingly targeted Western civilians this year. The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office notes at least 18 incidents in Kabul Province this year in which insurgents and criminals have targeted non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but not all included foreign nationals. Compared to previous years, there has been a consistently high volume of incidents against foreigners and an increased frequency in the deliberate targeting of foreigners. Most recently in Kabul, a female Canadian journalist was kidnapped, and a female British aid worker was assassinated. It is still unclear if the murder of the two DHL executives by a guard last weekend was due to personal grievances or a planned criminal/insurgent assassination. (Appendix source 10)

¶33. (S//NF) Pakistan - Kidnapping threat against unspecified targets in Islamabad: Tearline reports, &As of late October, a two-man kidnapping-for-ransom team had been dispatched by Khyber Agency, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Pakistan-based Afridi warlord Mangal Bagh to Islamabad, with order(s) to kidnap two to four unidentified persons. The only identifying characteristic of one of the targets was that he was a millionaire. The head of the kidnapping team was Ghazi Zinatullah (variant: Zeenatullah) from Bara, Khyber Agency, FATA. Zinatullah,s assistant was Wahidullah (variant: Waheedullah). Wahidullah was also from Bara.8

¶34. (S//NF) DS/TIA/ITA notes there is little convincing reporting indicating Mangal Bagh and his supporters have the capability to operate in Islamabad. Furthermore, the vague nature of this report renders it difficult to properly vet; although, name checks on Ghazi Zinatullah and Wahidullah and their variants yielded negative results. It is likely, however, Bagh and his network have the capability to launch kidnapping operations in Peshawar; reporting from mid-September indeed suggests he may have been involved with the August 26 ambush of the U.S. Consulate principal officer in Peshawar.

¶35. (S//NF) That said, since the beginning of September, four intelligence reports have detailed al-Qa,ida and Pakistani extremist plots to kidnap Westerners in Pakistan. Reporting detailing plots in Islamabad suggests kidnappers planned to target the F-6, F-7, and F-11 areas of Islamabad, presumably since they are neighborhoods where most Western foreigners reside. (Appendix sources 11-20)

¶36. (S//NF) Pakistan - Threat to U.S. Consulate Lahore and unspecified residence: As of late October, the al-Jihad group led by Sajid Ullah Moavia planned to attack U.S. Consulate



Lahore with shoulder-fired rockets from the rooftops of nearby high-rise buildings. The group, likely linked to al-Qa,ida,s Usama al-Kini, also planned to attack an unspecified residence on Zafar Ali Road in Lahore.

¶37. (S//NF) Although this information is likely circular in nature, DS/TIA/ITA judges al-Qa,ida and its affiliates are actively targeting Western interests in Lahore, including the U.S. Consulate and organizations, entities, or venues associated with the United States. Tearline from late September warned, &Terrorists were reportedly targeting the U.S. Consulate in the Punjab Province for suicide bombings and sniper attacks in late September. Extremists were planning to target the Lahore Consulate for suicide bombings using explosive-laden cars or suicide vests as well as snipers to shoot Americans driving out of the compound.8

¶38. (S//NF) While reporting detailing threats to Western interests in Pakistan has increased following the September 20 attack against the Marriott, earlier reporting regarding threats to Lahore is of particular concern due to its credibility and the demonstrated capability of terrorists to repeatedly carry out attacks in the city. Sensitive reporting from late July reported terrorists planned to attack U.S. organizations in Lahore. Likewise, Pakistani security services arrested four suspects linked to senior al-Qa,ida operative Usama al-Kini (Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) number 48128) in late July who plotted &large-scale8 attacks in the Punjabi capital and maintained a list of addresses of VIPs -- including officers of the Federal Investigative Agency, the police, and political leaders -- their routes, and a full schedule of their engagements.

¶39. (S//NF) Name checks on Sajid Ullah Moavia yielded inconclusive results; although, it may reference Ismatullah Mauvia (TIDE number 10541403), who is reportedly a leader of a Jaish-e-Mohammed splinter group that is currently part of Usama al-Kini,s network. It is unclear if this splinter group is known as al-Jihad. Al-Jihad is also the name of an infamous Egyptian Islamic extremist group active since the 1970s that targeted high-level Egyptian Government officials for attack. (Appendix sources 21-31)

¶40. (U) Cyber Threats

¶41. (U) England - Establishing new agencies to fight cyber crime:

¶42. (U) Key highlights:

A recent study on cyber crime incidents ranked the UK second behind the U.S.  
The UK,s NFRC is anticipated to begin operations in 2009.  
A police force specializing in cyber crime will operate in support of the NFRC.  
The threat of cyber crime is receiving increased global recognition.

¶43. (U) Source paragraph: &A new agency of the Attorney General,s Office, the National Fraud Strategic Authority (NFSA), has been established today (October 1) to increase protection for the UK economy from the harm caused by fraud through the creation of a more hostile environment for fraudsters, both at home and abroad.8

¶44. (U) CTAD comment: According to a survey commissioned in 2007 by security software company AVG Technologies, 43 percent of Britons feel more at risk for cyber theft than other crimes including burglary, assault, and robbery. Of the individuals polled, one in three had experienced theft over the Internet by way of tactics such as spear-phishing e-mail messages and credit card fraud. In a separate study conducted by online identity firm Garlik, cyber crime in the UK rose by more than 9 percent that year, with more than 250,000 reported incidents of online financial fraud alone. Fears about cyber crime expressed by citizens of the UK are certainly valid, as the country has risen to the rank of second place behind the U.S. in number of reported cyber

crimes.

¶45. (U) CTAD comment: To assist in stifling the rise of cyber crime incidents in the UK, the Attorney General's Office has announced the establishment of the NFSA tasked to work with private, public, and third-sector organizations to initiate, coordinate, and communicate counter-fraud activity across the economy.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, plans are also underway for a National Fraud Reporting Center (NFRC) anticipated to begin operations in 2009. The NFRC will function as a central point of contact for reporting e-crime, as well as an entity responsible for the organization of strategy for mitigating cyber incidents. A variety of online offenses will be handled by this agency, to include credit card theft, phishing, and hacking. In order to facilitate the coordination of nationwide investigations and bring together reports from victims of cyber crime across the UK, the NFRC will provide a telephone and Web-based reporting service that will enable individuals and companies to share information on reports of fraud and receive advice and information to protect themselves from future attacks.<sup>8</sup>

¶46. (U) CTAD comment: In addition to the NFRC, the UK Government plans to subsidize a new organization dubbed the Police Central e-crime Unit (PCeU). The PCeU's mission will be focused on the investigation of cyber crimes and Internet fraud and will operate in support of the NFRC. As part of the UK's national offensive against cyber crime, the PCeU will also collaborate with other police forces and crime-fighting agencies in operations concerning international and organized crime on the Internet.

¶47. (U) CTAD comment: The omnipresent cyber threat is garnering increased attention on a global scale, with focus turning toward better understanding ways to mitigate illicit activity. Initiatives such as those instituted by the UK as well as the establishment of transnational endeavors such as the International Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber-Terrorism -- of which the U.S. is a participant (see CTAD Daily Read File dated June 9) -- highlight the global awareness of the need for the development of systems and policies designed to defend against malicious cyber operations. Continued progress in this arena could aid in the creation of focused channels for global reporting of cybercrime, which may lead to increased insight for law enforcement and intelligence communities into the tactics, techniques, procedures, and motivations of cyber threat actors. (UK Attorney General's Office News Release, "UK Toughens Up on Fraudsters with New Anti-Fraud Authority,"<sup>8</sup> October 1, 2008)

¶48. (U) Suspicious Activity Incidents

¶49. (SBU) WHA - Barbados - Surveillance Detection Team (SDT) Bridgetown observed a man near the New Embassy Compound (NEC) October 28. He appeared to be paying close attention to the people exiting the visa section. (SIMAS Event: Bridgetown-00809-2008)

¶50. (SBU) Barbados - SDT Bridgetown observed a man near the NEC October 29. The man appeared to be paying close attention to the people exiting the visa section. He carried a digital camera and two cell phones. The man departed the area after approximately 20 minutes. (SIMAS Event: Bridgetown-00810-2008)

¶51. (SBU) Bolivia - SDT La Paz observed a man photographing the front of the U.S. Embassy October 27. The man then departed the area walking north. (SIMAS Event: La Paz-00328-2008)

¶52. (SBU) Brazil - SDT Recife observed a man across the street from the U.S. Consulate at 2:20 p.m. on October 27. The man appeared to be attempting to hide behind a lamp post while looking toward Post. After approximately 10 minutes, he departed the area. At 4:30 p.m., the man walked down the street in front of the Consulate, looking toward the Mission as he walked. (SIMAS Event: Recife-01014-2008)

¶53. (SBU) Honduras - SDT Tegucigalpa observed a man standing on the sidewalk near the U.S. Embassy October 17. The man observed the gate to the Consular area. Local Guard Force (LGF) personnel interviewed the man, who refused to give his name. After approximately 20 minutes, he departed the area in a Mazda pickup truck.

¶54. (SBU) Record Check/Investigation: Vehicle: Gray Mazda pickup truck (two door); License plate: PAP-7192 (Honduras). (SIMAS Event: Tegucigalpa-00276-2008)

¶55. (SBU) Peru - SDT Lima observed a woman near the visitor,s entrance of the U.S. Embassy October 28. She was approached by a local police officer and told to move. Half an hour later, she was observed again near Post,s visitor,s entrance. LGF and police personnel interviewed the subject, who stated she was waiting for a friend who was inside the Embassy. After approximately 25 minutes, she departed the area in a taxicab without meeting anyone.

¶56. (SBU) Record Check/Investigation: Subject: Maribel Julissa Leandro De Los Reyes. Identification number: ¶07508366. (SIMAS Event: Lima-04360-2008)

¶57. (SBU) EUR - Germany - A suspicious individual photographed with his cell phone camera up and down Marbachweg Street and Homburger Landstrasse in Frankfurt October 2.

¶58. (SBU) RSO Action/Assessment: This is an initial sighting of the subject. The route he was photographing is of considerable concern, as it is the primary route between the Mission housing area and the U.S. Consulate General. (SIMAS Event: Frankfurt-00518-2008)

¶59. (SBU) Germany - A suspicious bicycle with a plastic bag in its basket was parked at a bus stop close to U.S. Consulate General Frankfurt housing September 9. The bicycle was checked with negative results. The following day, the bike was gone.

¶60. (SBU) RSO Action/Assessment: Mission personnel use this bus stop as a primary transit route. (SIMAS Event: Frankfurt-00509-2009)

¶61. (SBU) Spain - Three Middle Eastern-appearing men sat on a bench in front of the U.S. Ambassador,s residence in Madrid October 21. A member of the Ambassador,s security detail noticed the subjects, who departed the area on foot after 20 minutes. (SIMAS Event: Madrid-00437-2008)

¶62. (SBU) EAP - Malaysia - SDT Kuala Lumpur observed two Middle Eastern-appearing men in front of the U.S. Embassy at 3:14 p.m. on October 29. They photographed each other along the street in front of Post. After approximately 5 minutes, they departed toward the south and entered the Iranian Embassy at 3:32 p.m. (SIMAS Event: Kuala Lumpur-00661-2008)

¶63. (SBU) Vietnam - SDT Ho Chi Minh City observed a man across the street from the U.S. Consulate General October 29. The man took notes and then photographs of the front of Post. The man departed the area on foot after approximately 5 minutes. (SIMAS Event: Ho Chi Minh City-00320-2008)

¶64. (SBU) SCA - Pakistan - SDT Lahore observed a man sitting in a rickshaw (three-wheeled taxi) parked near the access road to the U.S. Consulate October 16. The man watched Post,s access road and turned away two potential customers. Local police interviewed the subject, who stated he did not take either of the potential customers because he did not know the location of their intended destinations. After approximately 30 minutes, he departed the area.

¶65. (SBU) Record Check/Investigation: Subject: Habib Ahmed Bhatti. National identification card number: 35202-808057276-5. (SIMAS Event: Lahore-00683-2008)

¶66. (SBU) Pakistan - SDT Lahore observed a man on a bicycle



near the access road to the U.S. Consulate October 16. The man observed the vehicles passing by and talked on his cell phone. The local police interviewed him, and he stated he was waiting for his friend. The man departed the area after approximately 30 minutes.

¶67. (SBU) Record Check/Investigation: Subject: Mohammad Din. National identification number: 35202-2845350-1. (SIMAS Event: Lahore-00692-2008)

¶68. (SBU) Pakistan - SDT Karachi observed a man sitting on the sidewalk near an access gate to one of the U.S. Consulate General residential housing compounds October 19. After approximately 20 minutes, the man departed the area. (SIMAS Event: Karachi-00277-2008)

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Full Appendix with sourcing available upon request.

RICE